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Abstract
This paper introduces a version of the interdependent value model of Milgrom and Weber
(1982), where the signals are given by an index gathering signal shifters observed by the
econometrician and private ones specific to each bidders. The model primitives are shown
to be nonparametrically identified from first-price auction bids under a testable mild rank
condition. Identification holds for all possible signal values. This allows to consider a wide
range of counterfactuals where this is important, as expected revenue in second-price auction.
An estimation procedure is briefly discussed.
JEL: C57, C14
Keywords : First-price auction; interdependent values; nonparametric identification.
The authors acknowledge useful discussions, comments and encouragements from various conferences
and seminars participants. Emmanuel Guerre would like to thank more specifically Isabelle Perrigne and
Quang Vuong for stimulating discussions. The comments of two Referees and the Editor Elie Tamer have
been especially rich and useful to improve the paper. All remaining errors are our responsibility. Both
authors would like to thank the School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London, for
generous funding.
2
1 Introduction
Most nonparametric identification results or empirical studies for first-price auctions con-
sider the private value case. See for instance the review papers of Athey and Haile (2007)
or Hendricks and Porter (2007). This is probably due to the non identification result of
Laffont and Vuong (1996), which states that bids generated by interdependent values are
also rationalized by private values. This negative result has not prevented empirical work
for the interdependent case. In particular, Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994) consider an
asymmetric common value model for drainage tracts, where an informed bidder bids for a
neighbor tract and competes with non neighbor buyers. Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003)
have used ex post values observed after the auction to test rational bidding in a common
value framework. They consider an application to wild cat leases, where bidders can com-
mission seismic studies to evaluate the quantity of petrol or gas in the tracts. Shneyerov
(2006) has shown that the seller expected revenue in a first or second price auction can still
be identified. His results are applied to municipal bonds, which values are determined after
the auction, when sold to some final investors. Paarsch (1992), Haile, Hong and Shum (2003)
and Compiani, Haile and Sant’Anna (2018) propose to test whether bids are generated by
a common or a private value model. Hong and Shum (2002) restore identification using
a parametric common value model. Aradillas-Lo´pez, Gandhi and Quint (2013) use a set
identification approach in the more restrictive framework of correlated private values.
These papers fall in the interdependent value framework, where each bidder has a possibly
unknown value Vi and observes a univariate private signal Xi, i = 1, . . . , n. The parameters
of interest are the joint signal distribution and the valuation or value functions
Φi (X1, . . . , Xn) = E [Vi |X1, . . . , Xn ] (1.1)
which are sufficient to compute most counterfactuals. In the private value case, the valu-
ation only depends upon the bidder’s signal. By contrast, in the interdependent case, the
value of a given bidder can depend upon the signals of other bidders, creating so a net-
work of interactions which is difficult to identify from first-price auction bids without further
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restrictions.
In the symmetric case, Laffont and Vuong (1996) show that the bids only identify
V i (x, x) = E
[
Vi
∣∣∣∣Xi = x, max1≤j 6=i≤nXj = x
]
.
In particular, the “pseudo” private values V i = V i (Xi, Xi) generate equilibrium bids which
are observationally equivalent to the initial ones. As the private values V i are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d) when the signals Xi’s are, it would be tempting to ex-
pect that revenue equivalence results valid under the symmetric independent private value
paradigm extends to symmetric interdependent values. This is however misusing the ob-
servational equivalence results of Laffont and Vuong (1996) by ignoring bidder valuation
dependence. In particular, it is known that ascending auctions, during which bidders can
learn about their opponent’s signals, generates a higher expected seller revenue than first-
price auction. The optimal reserve price computed from the distribution of the pseudo
private values V i is also unlikely to be identical with the one taking into account bidder’s
interdependence. As the valuation functions are typically positively correlated, so will be the
bidder’s participation decisions, suggesting the seller faces a higher risk of non participation
under interdependent value than for independent private ones. Recovering the function Φi(·)
in (1.1) and the signal distribution is therefore important from an auction design perspective.
Functional restrictions have been used to restore identification within a symmetric frame-
work. Hong and Shum (2002) have shown that a Gaussian Wilson model is identified. Li,
Perrigne and Vuong (2000) consider an extension of the Wilson model where Vi = V for all
i, the signals satisfy Xi = V εi. They assume that, for some unknown parameter (θ0, θ1),
V i (x, x) = θ0x
θ1 for identification and estimation purposes. Fe´vrier (2008) relaxes the latter
assumption and shows identification when the conditional support of Xi given the common
value depends upon V . He (2015) considers Φi(x1, . . . , xn) = x¯ for all i.
Alternatively, observable asymmetries generated by bidder specific variables can be used
to obtain identification with such restrictions on Φi(·) or V i(·). Somaini (2018) considers a
valuation exclusion restriction, under which bidder i valuation only depends upon a bidder
specific shifter Zi, which is observed by all bidders and the econometrician. This is sufficient
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to obtain identification for additive valuation function. The present paper explores another
route, focusing on the signal, which is now supposed to be partly observable by all bidders
and the econometrician. More specifically, all the signals Xj appearing in (1.1) can be
decomposed into a D dimensional common knowledge “signal shifter” Zj and a private
vector component γij(Aj), where Aj is normalized to have a uniform distribution. These
two components are combined using a linear index structure, Xj = Z
′
jγij(Aj).
1 In the latter
expression, γij(·) is a common knowledge slope function which may depend upon the identity
of the considered bidder. If so, γij(·) incorporates a specific bidder i fixed effect, or can be
viewed as bidder i belief about the slope γjj(·) of bidder j.
The common knowledge variable Z can indicate better information or a higher value.2
For instance, Somaini (2018) considers the bidder distance to the place where works of
the auctioned contract has to be performed, which inverse can be both an indicator of
increasing information or lower cost. Bidder capacity constraints can also affect the value
of an auctioned contract. Length of common tract borders can be used as a measure of
information strength in the application of Hendricks et al. (1994.) The cost paid by bidders to
acquire information on a gas or oil contents on an auctioned lease, as described in Hendricks,
Pinske and Porter (2003), can also be used if common knowledge. Bidder reputation and
experience, measured for instance by time spent in activities related with the auctioned good
can again indicate a better information or a higher ability to process it for resale.
The variations of the continuous Zj’s are used to identify the function Φi(·) in (1.1) and
the slope functions γij (·), j = 1, . . . , n, from the bids observed in a first-price auction. The
joint distribution of the private signals is also identified assuming that a low signal does
1 The index structure is general enough to include sieve approximation of a signal function xij (zj , Aj),
provided Zj = [b1(zj), . . . , bD(zj)] for a sieve {bd(·)}∞d=1 and D growing with the sample size. Such extension
is however out of the scope of the present paper.
2Variation of the common knowledge slope functions γij(·) across i can also indicate a stronger bidder
due to an unobserved variable which stay constant across the sample, or a fixed effect. For instance, each
bidder collection of γij(·), j = 1, . . . , n may take the two distinct values γi(·) ≤ γj(·), j = 1, . . . , n indicating
a weak or a strong bidder.
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not prevent bidding and that bids increase with signal. Hence this interdependent value
model is fully identified and can be used for most usual counterfactual exercises. As our
nonparametric identification result uses local variation at given small value of the Zj’s, the
model is overidentified and can therefore be tested.
Athey and Haile (2002) have similarly considered good covariate variations for ascending
auctions with dependent private values. The nonparametric identification result stated in
Athey and Haile (2002, Theorem 5) relies on order statistic properties that are not relevant
here. The harder parameters to identify are the slope functions γij (·). In the two bidder
case, identification is obtained by differentiating with respect to the signal Ai and to the
covariate Zj. This gives a system of differential equations with a unique solution, identifying
so the slope functions. Similar identification procedure, based on uniqueness of the solution
of a differential equation, can be traced back to Elbers and Ridder (1982) in the context of
duration models, see also Abbring and van der Berg (2003). The case where three bidders or
more attend the auction is more involved but proceeds similarly: differentiating with respect
to the signal and covariate gives an integro-differential system, but it is shown that it also
identifies the slope functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our interdepen-
dent value models and three illustrative examples. Section 3 presents our main nonparametric
identification results. Section 4 discusses a possible two stage estimation procedure. Section
5 concludes the paper and proofs are grouped in Section 6.
2 Model, examples and assumptions
A single and indivisible object is sold to a known number n ≥ 2 of buyers using a first-price
auction. There is no reserve price and the seller accepts all nonnegative bids. The observa-
tions consist on the bidder identities, bids Bj and the signal shifters Zj, j = 1, . . . , n where n
is the total number of buyers. The next Section describes the model and bidding strategies,
and gives our key identification assumptions. The framework focuses on a particular bidder,
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say bidder i, which valuation function, or value, is a parameter of interest together with the
joint signal distribution introduced below.
2.1 Valuation function and examples
Buyers asymmetry is common knowledge and driven by individual D dimensional variables
Zj. Prior bidding, each buyers receive a private signal Ai. The joint distribution of the
signals A = (A1, . . . , An) given Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) is known to the buyers but not to the
analyst. The marginal distribution of each Ai is normalized to be uniform over [0, 1]. The
valuation function of buyer i is
Vi (A;Z) = Φi [Z
′
1γi1 (A1) , . . . , Z
′
nγin (An)] = Φi [Z,Γi (A)] , (2.2)
i = 1, . . . , n, where Φi (·) and Γi (A) = (γi1 (A1) , . . . , γin (An)) are unknown parameters
of interest.3 In this specification, the index Z ′jγij (Aj) can be viewed as a mixed signal
combining observable and unobservable components, and replaces the signal Xi from (1.1).
The function Φi combines these signals and reveals the interactions of the other bidders with
i, in terms of value. Examples are as follows, for which Γi (·) = Γ (·) is common to buyers.
• Additive valuation model. Bidder j observes a component Z ′jγj (Ai) of the total
valuation of the auctioned good, which is weighted with a weight πij by bidder i in her
value function
Vi (A;Z) =
n∑
j=1
πijZ
′
jγj (Aj) with πij ≥ 0
in which case Φi (x1, . . . , xn) =
∑n
j=1 πijxi. He (2015) obtains identification in the
symmetric case Vi (A;Z) =
∑n
j=1 γ (Aj) /n, but asymmetric specifications can be more
relevant for applications. For instance the auctioned good can be a piece of land ex-
pected to contain some resources, as in mineral rights auctions. In this type of auction,
3This specification can easily be extended to allow for an auction specific variable Z0, ie Vi (A;Z,Z0) =
Φi [Z
′
1γi1 (A1|Z0) , . . . , Z ′nγin (An|Z0)|Z0], by conditioning on Z0. Identification of this model follows from
applications, for each value of Z0, of Theorems 3 and 4 below.
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bidders exploit similar lots which can be adjacent or have similar characteristics to the
auctioned one, a observable information that can be recorded in Z. The signal Ai is
private to bidder i, being for instance the outcomes of her lot. A πij set to 0 may indi-
cate that bidders i and j would use the lot for different purposes, so that information
of i is not relevant for j and vice versa.
• A simplified auction with resale. Suppose each bidder is tied with a final buyer
to whom he can sell for sure the good at a price πiiZ
′
iγi (Ai) if she wins the auction.
After the auction, the winner can sell the good to the other final buyers at a price
πijZ
′
jγj (Aj). This gives the value functions
Vi (A;Z) = max
i=1,...,n
{
πijZ
′
jγj (Aj)
}
in which case Φi (x1, . . . , xn) = maxi=1,...,n {πijxi}.
• A non-Gaussian and asymmetric Wilson model. Suppose the value V of the
good is not observed by the buyers, who receive instead a noisy signal which accuracy
is bidder specific and common knowledge. A possible parameter of interest is the
quantile function γ0 (·) of V . Hence for a uniform A0, V = γ0 (A0), which can also be
written as
V = γ0 (F (ν))
where ν is a standard normal and F (·) its cdf. In the standard Wilson model, the value
is normal, ie V = ν up to a scale parameter, and assuming that the distribution of
V is unknown introduces additional complications. The signal structure resembles the
standard Wilson model, the signal of bidder i with observed accuracy σi for ν being
νi = ν + σiεi
with independent ν, ε1, . . . , εn drawn from the standard normal distribution. Note
that the information carried by the signal νi is equivalent to the uniform signal
Ai = F
(
νi√
1 + σ2i
)
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It follows that the distribution of ν given A1, . . . , An is
N
( ∑n
i=1
νi
σ2i
1 +
∑n
i=1
1
σ2i
,
1
1 +
∑n
i=1
1
σ2i
)
= N
∑ni=1
√
1+σ2i
σ2i
F−1(Ai)
1 +
∑n
i=1
1
σ2i
,
1
1 +
∑n
i=1
1
σ2i

Set Zi =
√
1+σ2
i
σ2i
, which gives 1
σ2i
=
(
Z2i +
1
4
)1/2 − 1
2
, so that a large Zi means a small
signal variance σ2i . The value function V (A;Z) = E [V |A,Z ] is identical across buyers
and satisfies, for Σ2(Z) = 1 +
∑n
i=1
1
σ2i
,
V (A;Z) =
1√
2π
∫
γ0
(∑n
i=1 ZiF
−1(Ai)
Σ2(Z)
+ Σ(Z)t
)
exp
(
−t
2
2
)
dt
= Ψ
(
n∑
i=1
ZiF
−1 (Ai) ,Σ(Z)
)
which, conditionally on Σ(Z), falls in the considered framework. Note that, for Zj =∞,
the variance σj vanishes so that bidder j knows the value V . Little algebra then gives
that
lim
Zi→+∞
V (A;Z) = γ0 (Ai) , for any i = 1, . . . , n, (2.3)
showing that the quantile function γ0(·) is identified from the value function under a
large support assumption for the bidder covariate.
As detailed below, the revisited Wilson model is easier to identify than the other Exam-
ples, due to the possibility of perfect information. We now detail our main Assumptions for
the value specification. In the sequel, we shall focus on the identification of buyer i valuation
function. Let I be the set of active signals, that is the signal affecting the valuation of bidder
i, or in other words, the smallest subset of {1, . . . , n} such that
Φi (x1, . . . , xn) = Φi [xj , j ∈ I] . (2.4)
Assumption Z. The variable Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) has support R
D
+∗ × · · · × RD+∗ = Z.
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Assumption A. The buyer signal Aj is uniform over [0, 1] given Z, j = 1, . . . , n.
The joint p.d.f c (·|Z) of A = (A1, . . . , An) given Z is strictly positive and continuously
differentiable with respect to the signal and the covariate.
Assumption G. The slope γij (·) are continuously differentiable over [0, 1] with non-
negative and nondecreasing entries, at least one being strictly increasing. In addition, one
of the following terminal and initial conditions holds:(i) γij(1) 6= 0 for all j in I or (ii)
γij(0) 6= 0 for all j in I
Assumption P. The set I is not empty. The function Φi (x1, . . . , xn) maps Rn+ into
R+∗ and is twice continuously differentiable with partial derivatives
∂Φi(·)
∂xj
> 0 over Rn+ for
all j in I.
Assumption Z imposes signal shifter linear independence and rules out discrete entries
to allow differentiation. Constant entries are also ruled out as it can cause identification loss
as in Laffont and Vuong (1996). That the entries of Z can be unbounded is a simplifying
assumption that can be weakened, but allows here to identifies Φ1(·) over its unbounded
definition domain. That the vector Z can go to 0 is used to identify the initial or terminal
values of the γij(·)’s later on.
Assumption A includes a standard normalization of the conditional signal distribution,
which are assumed to be uniform. This permits the use of the quantile approach of Gimenes
and Guerre (2019), see Lemma 1 below. Note however that the signal vector (A1, . . . , An)
can depend upon Z.
Assumption G imposes smooth and bounded mixed signals Z ′jγij (·).4 The terminal slope
condition G-(i) will be used when n = 2, while the initial one G-(ii), which implies G-(i)
when the slope entries are strictly increasing, is used for n = 3. Assumption P requests
a valuation function which is strictly increasing with respect to its argument and smooth.
4Assumption G rules out the revisited Wilson model example, for which γji (·) is infinite at 0 or 1. But
Assumption G is only needed to identify the unknown γji (·), and therefore not for this example since its
γij (·) are known.
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Assumptions G and P together imply that the value function Vi (A;Z) increases with each
private signal Aj , as assumed in Milgrom and Weber (1982). In the sequel, we shall focus
on the identification of buyer i valuation function, or equivalently of the pair [Φi (·) ,Γi (·)]
up to a scaling normalization, as [Φi (·/λ) , λΓi (·)] gives the same valuation function for all
λ > 0. A convenient normalization used in the proofs of the main results is
∂Φi (0, . . . , 0)
∂xj
= 1 for all j in I. (2.5)
2.2 Bidding strategies
Our identification results are based on high level bidding assumptions inspired by the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium framework. It is assumed that bids depend upon Z and bid-
der private signals
Bj = sj (Aj;Z) > 0, j = 1, . . . , n, Z ∈ Z.
In what follows, ϕ(1)(·; z) is the partial derivative ϕ(1)(α; z) = ∂
∂α
ϕ(α; z) with respect to the
quantile level.
Assumption S. For each Z in Z (i) the bidding strategy si (·;Z) satisfies the best
response condition
si (α;Z) ∈ argmax
b>0
E
[
(Vi (A;Z)− b) I
{
b ≥ max
1≤j 6=i≤n
Bj
}
|Ai = α, Z
]
. (2.6)
(ii) The initial condition s1 (0;Z) = · · · = sn (0;Z) holds. (iii) The terminal condition
s1 (1;Z) = · · · = sn (1;Z) holds. (iv) For each j = 1, . . . , n, sj (·;Z) is twice continuously
differentiable with s
(1)
j (·;Z) > 0 over [0, 1].
As in the preceding section, the focus is on identification of the valuation function of
bidder i, so that the best response condition (2.6) in Assumption S-(i) only concerns this
specific bidder: the other bidders do not need to use a best response bidding strategy. Note
however that, apart the initial condition of S-(ii), most of Assumption S is inspired by the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium framework where all the bidders use a best response bidding
strategy.
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Assumption S-(iv) is used in particular for the joint signal distribution, see Lemma 1, to-
gether with S-(ii,iii) to get its identification over the whole support [0, 1]n. The monotonicity
condition in S-(iv) is standard in the Econometrics of auctions when assuming bids from the
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. For affiliated signal and valuation functions Vi (A;Z) increasing
with respect to each signals, Reny and Zamir (2004) have established existence, but not
uniqueness, of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium with increasing bidding strategies. In the two
bidder case, Lizzeri and Persico (2000, Appendix) have studied uniqueness, strict monotonic-
ity and smoothness of the optimal bidding strategies as in S-(iv). But these assumptions
may not hold for bids not generated by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Discontinuities in the
strategy sj(·|Z) should generate flat parts in the cumulative distribution function of Bj or
discontinuities for its pdf. A non monotonic but differentiable sj(·|Z) can lead to a diverging
pdf, so that both are in principle testable.
The common terminal condition in Assumption S-(iii) is from Lizzeri and Persico (2000),
who established it in the two bidder case under the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium framework.
Intuitively, if a group of bidders have a common terminal bid larger than their opponents,
they can increase their profit by slightly decreasing their terminal bids and still be sure
to win the auction. Hence all the bidders should have the same sj(1;Z) as assumed in S-
(iii). This condition can be tested in principle, because if S-(iii) does not hold for a given
Z, there is a dominated bidder, say i0, with bid support upper bound b0(Z) such that
P
(
Bi0 ≤ b0(Z)
∣∣Z) = 1 and P (max1≤i≤nBi > b0(Z)∣∣Z) > 0 .
The initial condition in Assumption S-(ii) does not necessarily hold in the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium framework, especially with asymmetric bidders. It ensures that there is
no bidder who would lose the auction with probability 1 given a too low signal value. As a
consequence, the best-response characterization (2.6) of the bidding strategy implies the first
order condition (3.4) in Lemma 2 below, which is key for identification. Another important
econometric role of the initial condition S-(ii) together with the terminal one S-(iii) is to allow
for identification of the slope functions γij(·) over the whole quantile interval [0, 1], therefore
avoiding censoring. As Assumption S-(iii), Assumption S-(ii) is in principle testable.
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Strategy common initial condition and Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For bids
from Bayesian Nash equilibrium, additional restrictions may be needed to ensure that the
common initial condition S-(ii) holds, as discussed now. Assumption S-(ii) typically fails
when the initial valuations Vi(0;Z) differ across bidders. If the Vi(0;Z) are identical, say
equal to V (0;Z), it must hold for all i si(0;Z) = V (0;Z) under Assumption S-(iv).
5 Hence
Assumption S-(ii) holds if
V (0;Z) = Φ1 (Z
′
1γ11(0), . . . , Z
′
nγ1n(0)) = · · · = Φn (Z ′1γn1(0), . . . , Z ′nγnn(0)) . (2.7)
Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that the set I of all bidders is {1, . . . , n} and the
normalization (2.5), (2.7) holds when γj1(0) = · · · = γjn(0) for all j and, if these slope
do not vanish, Φ1(·) = · · · = Φn(·). So a sufficient condition for Assumption S-(ii) is the
following:
Condition BNE. One of the two restrictions holds:
(i). Common initial value: Φ1(0, . . . , 0) = · · · = Φn(0, . . . , 0) and γij(0) = 0 for all i, j =
1, . . . , n;
(ii). Common Φi(·) and initial slope: Φi(x1, . . . , xn) = Φ(x1, . . . , xn) and (γi1(0), . . . , γin(0)) =
(γ1(0), . . . , γn(0)) for all i.
5To see this, let αi(Z) = inf {α ∈ [0, 1];P (si(Ai;Z) wins and Ai ≥ α|Z) > 0} be the signal threshold
above which bidder i has a non trivial probability to win the auction. Under Assumption S-(iv), it must
hold that s1(α1(Z);Z) = · · · = sn(αn(Z);Z). Arguing as for (3.5), (3.6) and (3.4) give
sj(αj(Z);Z) = Φj [Z
′
1γj1(α1(Z)), . . . , Z
′
nγjn(αn(Z))]
which is strictly larger than the common V (0;Z) if one of the αi(Z) is strictly larger than 0 by Assumptions
G and P. Suppose now that one of αi(Z) is strictly larger than 0, say α1(Z) > 0 assuming it is the unique
one for the sake of brevity. It follows that bidder i = 2 expected profit given A2 = α is equivalent to, when
α goes to 0
Cαn−1
∫ α
1
0
{Φ2 [Z ′1γ21(α), Z ′2γ22(0), . . . , Z ′nγ2n(0)]− Φ2 [Z ′1γ21(α1(Z))Z ′2γ22(0), . . . , Z ′nγ2n(0)]} dα < 0
which is not possible as bidder 2 would achieve a non negative expected profit making a bid close to V (0;Z)
when A2 goes to 0. Hence it must hold that α1(Z) = 0.
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Condition BNE-(i) allows for more asymmetry, with a set I that can vary across bidders.
The common initial condition holds with Φi(0) = 0 in the three examples considered earlier.
By contrast, the common Φi(·) condition of BNE-(ii) is more demanding: it holds in the
Wilson model examples but requests, in the two first examples, that the weights do not
depend upon bidder identity, πij = πj. More generally, Condition BNE-(ii) forces the set I
of active bidders to be identical across bidders. Because the slope γij(·) can be very small,
this may nevertheless be flexible enough to mimic any set I of active signals.
2.3 Rank condition
Our main identification condition is a rank condition stated in Assumption I below. Let
Gj (b|Z) = P (Bj ≤ b|Z)
be the c.d.f of Bj given Z, Bj (α|Z) = G−1j (α|Z) be the associated conditional quantile
function and set
GjBi (α|Z) = Gj [Bi (α|Z) |Z] .
An important consequence of Assumption S-(ii,iii) and Lemma 1-(ii) below, which states
that si(·|Z) = Bi(·|Z), is that GjBi (0|Z) = 0 and GjBi (1|Z) = 1 for all j. Recall that I
is the smallest subset satisfying Φi (x1, . . . , xn) = Φi [xj , j ∈ I]. Recall Z ′k = (Z1k, . . . , ZDk)′
and let ∂ZkGjBi (α|Z) be the gradient column vector
∂ZkGjBi (α|Z) =
[
∂GjBi (α|Z)
∂Z1k
, . . . ,
∂GjBi (α|Z)
∂ZDk
]′
.
Assumption I. Let I be as in (2.4) and suppose I 6= {i}. For all j in I \ {i},
GjBi (α|Z) is twice continuously differentiable with respect to (α, Z) in [0, 1] × Z. For all
(α, Z) of [0, 1)× Z, the (Card(I)− 1)× (Card(I)− 1) matrix with typical entries
Z ′k∂ZkGjBi (α|Z)
α(1− α) , j, k ∈ I \ {i}
is full rank.
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Assumption I is not binding in the private value case due to the condition I 6= {i}. Ob-
serve also that, for α = 0 and α = 1 respectively, ∂ZkGjBi (α|Z) /α and ∂ZkGjBi (α|Z) /(1−
α) stands for the limit ∂Zkgjbi (α|Z). Note that a stronger rank condition than in Assump-
tion I is in principle testable using the whole set of bidders {1, . . . , n} instead of the unknown
I, as Z ′k∂ZkGjBi (α|Z) can be consistently estimated.
The important role played by GjBi (α|Z) is better illustrated looking at Lemma 1 below,
which shows in particular that the increasing strategy si (·|Z) is identical to the bid quantile
function Bi (·|Z). If the other bidders j use strictly increasing and continuous strategies
sj (·|Z), then
GjBi (α|Z) = s−1j [si (α|Z)]
which is an indicator of asymmetric bidding. The rank condition in Assumption I fails in
particular if GjBi (α|Z) = α for all j, which means that the buyers bid using the same
symmetric strategy s (α|Z). In such case, the variable Z plays a role similar to a charac-
teristic of the auctioned good. If the bids are drawn from a Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
the non-identification argument of Laffont and Vuong (1996) holds, showing that there is a
private information value model which is observationally equivalent to the one at hand. The
rank condition does not hold if GjBi (α|Z) = Cji (α) is independent of Z, which gives that
sj (α|Z) = si
[
C−1ji (α) |Z
]
for all j 6= i in I.
3 Main identification results
This section considers first identification of the signal distribution. Section 3.2 then derives
the identification implications for the valuation function of the best response condition (2.6)
in Assumption S-(i). In particular, the revisited Wilson model is shown to be identified.
However, other valuation function models may not be identified for all signal values. As
shown in Section 3.3, the mixed signal value function is identified in full generality, which
ensures that this specification can be used for counterfactuals that requests to know value
functions for all possible signals. The latter includes in particular the computation of an
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expected revenue, which involves integration over all possible signals.
3.1 Bidding strategy and signal distribution
The next lemma directly follows from the increasing strategy assumption. Lemma 1-(ii)
shows that the bid quantile function is the bid strategy function, while identification of the
distribution of the signal vector A given Z follows from (i). Lemma 1-(iii) will be used for
identifying the valuation function later on.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumptions A and S-(ii,iii,iv) hold. Then
(i). [Signal identification] For each j = 1, . . . , n, the signals Aj satisfy
Aj = Gj (Bj |Z) .
and are therefore identified, as the conditional signal distribution.
(ii). [Signal bid function identification] For each j = 1, . . . , n, the signal bid function
satisfies
sj (α;Z) = Bj (α|Z) .
(iii). [Winning probability identification] Suppose bidder i bid is si (a;Z) while her
signal Ai is equal to α. Then the probability ωi (a|α, Z) that bidder i wins the auction
given Ai = α and Z is identified and is equal to
ωi (a|α, Z) = P
[
Bi (a|Z) > max
1≤j 6=i≤n
Bj
∣∣∣∣Ai = α, Z]
Proof of Lemma 1: see Appendix.
3.2 A preliminary identification result for the valuation function
The next Lemma is an asymmetric version of first-order condition that determines the bid-
ding strategy in Milgrom and Weber (1982), see also Laffont and Vuong (1996), Guerre,
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Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Haile et al. (2003) for econometric applications. A distinc-
tive feature of the quantile approach developed here comes from Lemma 1-(ii), which shows
that the bidding strategy si (·;Z) is equal to the bid quantile Bi (·|Z) because si (·;Z) is
strictly increasing and continuous by Assumption S-(iv). It follows that the best response
condition (2.6) is equivalent to
α = arg max
a∈[0,1]
E
[
(Vi (A;Z)− Bi (a|Z)) I
{
Bi (a|Z) ≥ max
1≤j 6=i≤n
Bj
}
|Ai = α, Z
]
(3.1)
for all α in [0, 1] under Assumption S. Define
V i (a|α, Z) = E
[
Vi (A;Z) I
{
Bi (a|Z) ≥ max
1≤j 6=i≤n
Bj
}
|Ai = α, Z
]
. (3.2)
Observe that the expected payoff in (3.1) is equal to
V i (a|α, Z)− Bi (a|Z)ωi (a|α, Z)
and that {
Bi (a|Z) ≥ max
1≤j 6=i≤n
Bj
}
=
⋃
1≤j 6=i≤n
{Aj ≤ Gj [Bi (a|Z)|Z]} .
Since Bi (·|Z) = si (·|Z), Gj (·|Z) = s−1j (·|Z) and because the p.d.f c (·|Z) are continuously
differentiable by Assumptions S-(iv) and A respectively, so are V i (·|α, Z) and ωi (·|α, Z).
The first-order condition associated with (3.1) therefore implies
∂V i (a|α, Z)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=α
− Bi (α;Z) ∂ωi (a|α, Z)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=α
− B(1)i (α;Z)ωi (α|α, Z) = 0. (3.3)
Define
Ωi (α|Z) = ωi (α|α, Z)
∂ωi(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
, Ui (α|Z) =
∂V i(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
∂ωi(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
.
Rearranging (3.3) gives the next Lemma.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions A and S, it holds for each Z of Z and all α in [0, 1]
Ui (α|Z) = Bi (α|Z) +B(1)i (α|Z)Ωi (α|Z) (3.4)
and Ui (·|·) is identified.
17
As Ωi (·|Z) is identified by Lemma 1-(iii), Equation (3.4) in Lemma 2 shows that Ui (·|Z) is
identified. The merits and limitations of this identification result are now discussed for the
two and three bidders general case and for the revisited Wilson model.
3.2.1 Two bidders general case
It is assumed here that the bidder covariate are of dimension 1 and that Vi (A;Z) is a general
valuation function. Suppose without loss of generality that i = 1. Observe that the p.d.f
of A2 given A1 = α and Z is c (α, ·|Z) as A1 has a uniform distribution over [0, 1] given
Z. Recall that G2B1 (a|Z) = G2 [B1 (a|Z) |Z] has a positive derivative g2b1 (a|Z) by Lemma
1-(ii) and Assumption S-(iii). This gives for V 1 (a|α, Z) as in (3.2) and ω1 (a|α, Z) as in
Lemma 1-(iii)
V 1 (a|α, Z) =
∫ 1
0
V1 (α, t;Z) I [B1 (a|Z) ≥ B2 (t|Z)] c (α, t|Z)dt
=
∫ G2B1(a|Z)
0
V1 (α, t;Z) c (α, t|Z) dt,
ω1 (a|α, Z) =
∫ 1
0
I [B1 (a|Z) ≥ B2 (t|Z) dt] c (α, t|Z) dt =
∫ G2B1(a|Z)
0
c (α, t|Z) dt
so that
∂V 1 (a|α, Z)
∂a
= g2b1 (a|Z) V1 (α,G2B1 (a|Z) ;Z) c (α,G2B1 (a|Z) |Z)
∂ω1 (a|α, Z)
∂a
= g2b1 (a|Z) c (α,G2B1 (a|Z) |Z) .
Hence
U1 (α|Z) =
∂V 1(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
∂ω1(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
= V1 (α,G2B1 (α|Z) ;Z) . (3.5)
It follows from Lemma 2 that, for each Z, V1 (α1, α2;Z) is nonparametrically identified
over the curve
{(α1, α2) ;α2 = G2B1 (α1|Z) , α1 ∈ [0, 1]} .
This is insufficient to identify V1 (·) over [0, 1]2×Z nonparametrically. However identification
may hold under further restrictions of the valuation function as detailed here.
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• Bidder covariate exclusion restriction. Somaini (2018) considers the exclusion
restriction V1 (α1, α2;Z) = V1 (α1, α2;Z1), which, for a given Z1, ensures identification
of the latter for any α1 in [0, 1] and α2 in [minZ2 G2B1 (α1|Z) ,maxZ2 G2B1 (α1|Z)] by
a proper choice of Z2.
• Separability restriction. Consider the additive specification
V1 (α1, α2;Z) = v1 (α1, α2) + v0 (Z)
with the normalization v1 (0, 0) = 0.
6 As G2B1 (0|Z) = 0 under Assumption S-(ii),
v2 (Z) = U1 (0|Z) is identified and so is v1 (α1, G2B1 (α1|Z)) = U1 (α1|Z) − U1 (0|Z).
It then follows that the valuation function of bidder 1 is identified for any α1 in [0, 1]
and α2 in [minZ G2B1 (α1|Z) ,maxZ G2B1 (α1|Z)], which may differ from [0, 1]. This
restriction on α2 can be removed under an additional additive assumption. Suppose
now v1(α1, α2) = v11(α1) + v12(α2) with v11(0) = v12(0) = 0. Then U1(·|Z) identifies
u1(α|Z) = v11(α) + v12 (G2B1 (α|Z)) .
As ∂Zu1(α|Z) = v(1)12 (G2B1 (α1|Z)) ∂ZG2B1 (α|Z), it follows that v(1)12 (·) is identified
over [0, 1] if, for each α in [0, 1], there exists a Z such that ∂ZG2B1 (α|Z) 6= 0. Hence
the initial condition v12(0) = 0 yields that v12(·) is identified, and then v11(·) is also
identified, both over the whole [0, 1].
• Signal exclusion restriction. The value function is identified in the private value
case V1 (α1, α2;Z) = V1 (α1;Z). The signal exclusion restriction V1 (α1, α2;Z) =
V1 (α2;Z) yields, for each Z, identification for all α2 between minα1∈[0,1]G2B1 (α1|Z)
6As discussed for the mixed signal specification, the common initial strategy condition of Assumption
S-(ii) holds for Bayesian Nash equilibrium bids if all bidders have the same v0(Z). Assuming an exclusion
restriction v0i(Z) = v0i(Zi) as in Somaini (2018) is also possible, using for identification purpose values Z
satisfying v01(Z1) = · · · v0n(Zn), which are identified by the participation of all bidders. It is also desirable
to assume that A and Z are independent as identifying the conditional distribution of A given Z is difficult
when S-(ii) does not hold.
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and maxα1∈[0,1]G2B1 (α1|Z), i.e. in [0, 1] under Assumption S-(ii) and the conditions
in Lizerri and Persico (2000).
Hence identification may not hold for all signals, possibly preventing to implement some
counterfactuals such as computation of an optimal reserve price. As seen from Theorems 3
and 4 below, this contrasts with the mixed signal value functions considered here.
3.2.2 Three bidder general case
The case of a larger number n of bidders is more difficult because the identified expected
value is a multiple integral of order n − 2. To see this, suppose that n = 3 and that the
valuation of interest is the one of the first bidder. The p.d.f of (A2, A3) given A1 = α and Z
is c (α, ·, ·|Z) and V 1 (a|α, Z), ω1 (a|α, Z) are now given by
V 1 (a|α, Z) =
∫
V1 (α, t2, t3;Z) I [B1 (a|Z) ≥ max {B2 (t3|Z) , B2 (t3|Z)}] c (α, t2, t3|Z) dt2dt3
=
∫ G3B1(a|Z)
0
[∫ G2B1(a|Z)
0
V1 (α, t2, t3;Z) c (α, t2, t3|Z) dt2
]
dt3,
ω1 (a|α, Z) =
∫ G3B1(a|Z)
0
[∫ G2B1(a|Z)
0
c (α, t2, t3|Z) dt2
]
dt3.
Hence
∂ω1 (a|α, Z)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=α
× U1 (α|Z)
= g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
V1 (α, t2, G3B1 (α|Z) ;Z) c (α, t2, G3B1 (α|Z) |Z) dt2
+ g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
V1 (α,G2B1 (α|Z) , t3;Z) c (α,G2B1 (α|Z) , t3|Z) dt3, (3.6)
∂ω1 (a|α, Z)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=α
= g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
c (α, t2, G3B1 (α|Z) |Z) dt2
+ g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
c (α,G2B1 (α|Z) , t3|Z) dt3.
Lemma 2 therefore establishes nonparametric identification of an integral function of the val-
uation function over a set of signal variables (α1, α2, α3) = (α1, G2B1 (α1|Z) , G3B1 (α1|Z)).
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As for the two bidder case, this may not be useful for most applications without further re-
striction on the valuation function. Somaini (2018) derives some identification results under
covariate exclusion.
3.2.3 Revisited Wilson model
On the other hand, the revisited Wilson model is an example of specification that can be
easily identified from Lemma 2. Indeed (2.3) and the expressions of U1 (α|Z) derived above
imply
lim
Z1→+∞
U1 (α|Z) = γ0 (α)
because Z1 = +∞ means that bidder 1 is perfectly informed about the value of the good.
This is sufficient to recover identification of this specification.
3.3 Identification of the mixed signal valuation function
The mixed signal valuation specification (2.2) can be identified using a three step procedure.
First an initial or terminal value for the slope functions γij(·) is identified. Second, the func-
tion Φi (·) is identified. Third, thanks to the rank condition I, the slope functions are then
determined as solving a differential, or an integro-differential, equation. Identification of the
slope functions holds over the full set [0, 1]n of signals, as suitable for many counterfactual
applications. However the identification procedure implementation importantly differs de-
pending whether there are two bidders or more, especially in the first step and in the choice
of identifying an initial or a terminal value for the slope functions.
3.3.1 Two bidder case
Suppose n = 2 and let bidder 1 Φ1(·) and (γ11(·), γ12(·)) be the parameters of interest. Hence
Lemma 2 and (3.5) show that
U1 (α|Z) = Φ1 [Z ′1γ11 (α) , Z ′2γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]] (3.7)
is identified. The considered next step is the identification of a terminal value for (γ11(·), γ12(·)).
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Step 1: identification of I and (γ11(1), γ12(1)). As G2B1 (1|Z) = 1 for all Z by the
terminal condition of Assumption S-(ii) and Lemma 1-(ii), setting α = 1 in (3.7) yields the
identity
U1 (1|Z) = Φ1 (Z ′1γ11 (1) , Z ′2γ12 (1))
and Φ1 (Z
′
1γ11 (1) , Z
′
2γ12 (1)) is therefore identified. As all γ1j(1) are not 0 under Assumption
G-(ii), Assumption P ensures that j does not belong to I if and only if
∂Zk [U1 (1|Z)] =
∂Φ1 (Z
′
1γ11 (1) , Z
′
2γ12 (1))
∂xj
γ1j (1) = 0 for all Z in Z.
This implies that I =
{
j; ∂Φ1(·,·)
∂xj
6= 0
}
is identified. As
lim
Z→0
∂ZjU1 (1|Z) =
∂Φ1 (0, 0)
∂xj
γ1j (1)
for a smooth Φ1(·) satisfying Assumption P, using the normalization (2.5) shows that γ1j(1)
is identified for all j in I.
Step 2: identification of Φ1(·). Consider x = (x1, x3) in R2+∗. For k in the identified I,
there is a Zk in R
D
+∗ such that xk = Z
′
kγ1k(1), recalling that γ1k(1) has been identified in the
preceding step. When k does not belong to I, choose an arbitrary Zk in RD+∗. It then holds
for such choice of Z1 and Z2
Φ1(x1, x2) = Φ1 (Z
′
1γ11(1), Z
′
2γ12(1))
so that Φ1(·) is identified over R2+∗. Under Assumption P, continuity of Φ1(·) ensures it is
identified over R2+.
Step 3: identification of (γ11(·), γ12(·)). Suppose first the private value case I = {1},
ie Φ1(x1, x2) = Φ1(x1). Then monotonicity in Assumption P and (3.7) show that Z
′
1γ1(·) =
Φ−11 [U(·|Z1, Z2)] for any (Z1, Z2) in Z. If I = {2}, ie bidder 1 is uninformed, γ2 [G2B1(α|Z)]
is similarly identified, which ensures that γ2(·) as the identified G2B1(·|Z) is one to one by
Lemma 1-(ii) under Assumption S-(iv).
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Consider now the case where I = {1, 2}. Observe that, since g2b1 (·|Z) > 0 by Assumption
S-(iv) and Lemma 1-(ii),
∂Z2 {γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]} = γ(1)12 [G2B1 (α|Z)] ∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z)
= γ
(1)
12 [G2B1 (α|Z)] g2b1 (α|Z)
∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z)
g2b1 (α|Z)
=
∂ {γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z)
g2b1 (α|Z) . (3.8)
Differentiating U1 (α|Z) with respect to α and Z2 then gives
∂Φ1
∂x1
[γ11 (α)Z1, γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2]Z1dγ11 (α)
dα
+
∂Φ1
∂x2
[γ11 (α)Z1, γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2]Z2∂ {γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
=
∂U1 (α|Z)
∂α
,
∂Φ1
∂x2
[γ11 (α)Z1, γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2] γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]
+
∂Φ1
∂x2
[γ11 (α)Z1, γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2]Z2∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z)
g2b1 (α|Z)
∂ {γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
= ∂Z2U1 (α|Z)
which shows that Γ1 (α|Z) = [γ11 (α) , γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]]′ are the solution of a 2 × 2 system
of differential equations with the terminal condition Γ1 (1|Z) = [1, 1]′. Standard unique-
ness of the solution of such differential systems would then ensure that Γ1 (·|Z), and then
[γ11(·), γ12(·)], is identified. Unfortunately, this argument cannot be applied here because
the item ∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z), which appears in front of γ(1)11 (·) in the differential system, vanishes
when α = 1, 0 due to the terminal and initial bidding strategy conditions in Assumption
S-(ii,iii) and Lemma 1, which identifies strategy and bid quantile functions. This issue is
addressed in the proof of the next Theorem in the Appendix.7 Theorem 3 summarizes the
identification result.
7 As noted by a Referee, taking Z2 and Z1 equal to 0 would give, respectively
Z ′1γ11(α) = Φ
−1|x1
1 [U1(α|Z1, 0), 0] ,
Z ′2γ12(α) = Φ
−1|x2
1 [0, U1((G2B1(α|0, Z2))|0, Z2)] ,
where Φ
−1|x1
1 (y, ·) is the inverse of x2 7→ Φ1(y, x2) and Φ−1|x21 (·, y) is similarly defined. Hence γ11(·) and
γ12(·) would be identified. This may be however difficult to implement for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bids.
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Theorem 3 Suppose Assumptions A, I, G with the terminal condition G-(i), P and Z hold
and that n = 2. Then, up to a normalization of Φi(·, ·) and (γ11(·), γ12(·)) as (2.5):
(i). The set I of active signals defined in (2.4) is identified;
(ii). The function Φi (x1, x2) is identified over R
2
+;
(iii). The slope functions γij (·) are identified for all j in I.
Proof of Theorem 3: see Appendix.
Note that identification of the slope makes use of values of Z in the vicinity of 0, plus an
arbitrary non vanishing Z, so that the slopes are overidentified. This identification procedure
also works when bidder i makes dominated bids below a threshold αi(Z), which is identified
by the probability of observing such bids, as it is sufficient to solve the differential system
over [αi(Z), 1]. Identification of the slope would then hold over [infZ αi(Z), 1].
In the two bidder case, identification is based upon the terminal strategy condition S-
(iii), which is quite satisfactory here as it is based on a well established result of Lizzeri
and Persico (2000) when bids are drawn from a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium with valuation
functions from the mixed signal specification. It implies that the initial slope values are
unconstrained by Assumption G. Hence both conditions BNE-(i) and (ii) can be used to
ensure that the initial strategy condition S-(ii) holds with Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bids.
3.3.2 More than two bidders
We first explain why using, as in the two bidder case, the terminal value of U1(·|Z) for
identification purpose becomes difficult when the number of bidders is larger. For the sake
of discussion brevity, assume n = 3, the case of a higher number of bidders being similar,
For instance, in the private value case with bidder 2 value Z ′2γ22(A2), the bidding strategies B1(·|Z) and
B2(·|Z) may have degenerate limits, if any, when Z2 goes to 0, because the fact that bidder 2 value goes
to 0 is also known to bidder 1. As shown by (3.7), it follows that establishing the existence of U1(α|Z1, 0),
U1((G2B1(α|0, Z2))|0, Z2), or even limZ1↓0 U1(α|Z), limZ2↓0 U1((G2B1(α|Z))|Z), may be difficult.
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and take i = 1. Let W1 (α|Z) = ∂V 1(a|α,Z)∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
be the function in (3.6), so that U1(α|Z) =
W1 (α|Z) /
(
∂ω1(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
)
. For α = 1, it holds under the terminal strategy condition in
Assumption S-(ii)
W1 (1|Z) =g3b1 (1|Z)
∫ 1
0
Φ1 (Z
′
1γ11(1), Z
′
2γ12 (t2) , Z
′
3γ13(1)) c (t2|A1 = 1, A3 = 1, Z) dt2
+ g2b1 (1|Z)
∫ 1
0
Φ1 (Z
′
1γ11(1), Z
′
2γ12(1), Z
′
3γ13(t3)) c (t3|A1 = 1, A2 = 1, Z) dt3.
Hence W1(1|Z) now depends upon the whole slope functions γ12(·) and γ13(·), while only
the slope terminal values were involved in the two bidder case. Using the terminal value
of U1(·|Z) for identification purpose does not seem feasible and we use instead the common
initial strategy condition of Assumption S-(ii).8
It is first shown in the proof of Theorem 4 that
Ui (0|Z) = Φi [Z ′1γi1 (0) , . . . , Z ′nγin (0)] , (3.9)
which is identified by Equation (3.4) in Lemma 2. When all the γij(0), j in I, differ from 0
as assumed in Assumption G-(ii), arguing as in the Step 1 of the two bidder case permits to
identify I and those γij(0). Repeating Step 2 of the two bidder case then yields that Φi(·)
is identified.
Identifying the slope functions γij(·) is slightly more complicated than in Step 3 of the
two bidder case. Differentiating the identified Ui(α|Z) with respect to the signal shifters Zj,
j 6= i now gives an integro-differential system. The proof of Theorem 4, which summarizes
our identification result for n ≥ 3, establishes uniqueness of its solution.
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions A, I, G with the initial condition G-(ii), P and Z hold.
Then, up to a normalization of Φi(·, · · · , ·) and (γ11(·), . . . , γ1n(·)) as (2.5):
8Letting Z goes to 0 allows to identify (limZ↓0 g3b1 (1|Z))
∫ 1
0
γ12(t)c (t|A1 = 1, A3 = 1, 0)dt +
(limZ↓0 g2b1 (1|Z)) γ12(1) and a similar functional of γ13(·), which can be used instead of the first order
condition. We did not attempt to implement this approach, which is not straightforward, due to the fact
that the limits of gjb1(1|z), j = 2, 3, when Z goes to 0 may not be well defined as discussed in footnote 7
for the limits of GjB1(1|z).
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(i). The set I of active signals defined in (2.4) is identified;
(ii). The function Φi (x1, . . . , xn) is identified over R
n
+;
(iii). The slope functions γij (·) are identified for all j in I.
Proof of Theorem 4: see Appendix.
Theorem 4 also applies to the two bidder case, but relies more importantly on the initial
strategy condition in Assumption S-(ii), which is less natural than the terminal one S-(iii)
derived in Lizzeri and Persico (2000). Because identification relies on the initial value Ui(0|Z)
instead of Ui(1|Z) used for the two bidder case, Theorem 4 makes use of the initial slope
Assumption G-(ii), which imposes that γij(0) must differ from 0 for all j of I. This has
important consequences for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium bids as only the common Φi(·) and
initial slope restrictions of Condition BNE-(ii) can be used.9 This reduces the degrees of
bidder asymmetry permitted by the mixed signal specification, as the only possible cause of
asymmetry is now given by distinct slopes γij(α) for α > 0. As many studies assume that
Φi(x1, . . . , xn) = x1+ · · ·+xn as in Somaini (2018) and because the slopes γij(·) can be very
small, this may nevertheless be flexible enough for many applications.
4 Estimation strategy
The identification proof is constructive and can be directly used for estimation, although
more suitable procedures can be proposed, as a procedure similar to the one introduced by
9 A conjecture that would allow to use Condition BNE-(i), which allows for more asymmetric functions
Φi(·), is that under Assumption G-(i) which states that γij(0) = 0 for all i, j, all the strategies si(τiα|Z/α)
converge when α goes to 0 because the corresponding valuation functions satisfy
lim
α↓0
Φi
(
Z ′1γi1(τ1α)
α
, . . . ,
Z ′nγin(τnα)
α
)
= Φi
(
Z ′1γ
(1)
i1 (0)τ1, . . . , Z
′
nγ
(1)
in (0)τn
)
.
Setting the τi to 1 will then allows to identify Φi(·) as the γ(1)i1 (0) do not vanish and can be identified using
Z → 0 and (2.5). Establishing this conjecture is however out of the scope of the present paper.
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Botosaru (2019) for a duration model with unobserved heterogeneity. Consider for the sake
of brevity the two bidder case. The first stage consists in an estimation of U1 (α|Z) based
on (3.4) in Lemma 2
Û1 (α|Z) = B̂1 (α|Z) + B̂(1)1 (α|Z) Ω̂1 (α|Z)
where the quantile derivative estimator can be obtained using Gimenes and Guerre (2019).
Recall now that U1 (α|Z) = Φ1 [γ11 (α)Z1, γ12 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2] by (3.7), which could be esti-
mated using
Φ1
[
γ11 (α)Z1, γ12
[
Ĝ2B̂1 (α|Z)
]
Z2
]
.
The second stage of the procedure matches the above with Û1 (α|Z) to produce an estimator
of Φ1 (·), γ11 (·) and γ12 (·)[
Φ̂1 (·) , γ̂11 (·) , γ̂12 (·)
]
= arg min
Φ,γ1,γ2
∫ {∫ 1
0
(
Û1 (α|Z)− Φ
[
γ1 (α)Z1, γ2
[
Ĝ2B̂1 (α|Z)
]
Z2
])2
dα
}
dZ
where the minimization is performed over a sieve for γ1(·), γ2(·) and Φ(·), or over a simpler
set of functions Φ(·), such as the additive of maximum functions of the two first examples.
Up to the estimation Ĝ2B̂1 (·|·), these estimators can be studied as in Botosaru (2019).
Practical computation of these estimators can be done in the following iterative way
Φ̂1,k+1 (·) = argmin
Φ1
∫ {∫ 1
0
(
Û1 (α|Z)− Φ1
[
γ̂11,k (α)Z1, γ̂12,k
[
Ĝ2B̂1 (α|Z)
]
Z2
])2
dα
}
dZ,
[γ̂11,k+1 (·) , γ̂12,k+1 (·)]
= arg min
,γ1,γ2
∫ {∫ 1
0
(
Û1 (α|Z)− Φ̂1,k+1
[
γ1 (α)Z1, γ2
[
Ĝ2B̂1 (α|Z)
]
Z2
])2
dα
}
dZ. (4.1)
Alternatively to (4.1), γ̂11,k+1 (·) and γ̂12,k+1 (·) can be obtained by solving the differential
system in Section 3.3.1 using Φ̂1,k+1 (·) in place of Φ1 (·). The stopping criterion must take
into account that Φ1 (x1, x2) may depend only upon x1 or x2. For instance, in the private
value case Φ1 (x1, x2) = Φ1 (x1), the valuation function is Φ1 [γ11 (α)Z1] and γ12 (·) is not
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identified. If this holds, γ̂12,k (·) may not converge when k grows. This can be addressed
by dropping out of the minimization the corresponding slope when the sieve coefficients of
Φ̂1,k (x1, x2) shows that this function may not depend upon x1 or x2.
5 Conclusion
The present paper considers a nonparametric interdependent value model which is shown to
be identified from first-price auction best response bids. The model is derived from Milgrom
and Weber (1982) and assumes that the bidder signal depends upon some observed bidder
characteristics, which variations are key to obtain identification. Compared to other ap-
proaches of the literature, this specification does not rely on functional restrictions difficult
to maintain or to test and delivers valuation functions that can be computed for all possi-
ble signal values. The latter allows to implement various counterfactuals, such as expected
revenue computation for alternative auction scenarii. Most of the conditions ensuring iden-
tification are testable. The considered interdependent value model is overidentified, so that
specification testing is possible.
While the proposed approach assumes that the bidder private signal and information
shifter are combined using a linear index structure, we believe that the identification proce-
dure is general enough to tackle various other functional forms. The linear index may also
be viewed as a nonparametric approximation of a function combining private signals and
information shifter. Unobserved bidder heterogeneity would also deserve further research,
investigating for instance implementations of nonparametric deconvolution techniques as in
Li et al. (2000) or Krasnokutskaya (2011), the approach of Compiani et al. (2018) and Haile
and Kitamura (2018), or parametric specifications.
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Appendix: Proofs of the results
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
As Bj = sj(Aj ;Z) where sj (·;Z) is strictly increasing under Assumption S-(ii) and because
Aj is a U[0,1] random variable, it holds for all b in [sj(0;Z), sj(1;Z)]
Gj (b|Z) = P (Bj ≤ b|Z) = P [sj(Aj;Z) ≤ b|Z] = P
[
Aj ≤ s−1j (b;Z)|Z
]
= s−1j (b;Z).
Hence Gj (Bj |Z) = s−1j [sj(Aj ;Z);Z] = Aj and Bj (·|Z) = G−1j (·|Z) = sj (·;Z), which
establish (i) and (ii). (iii) follows from
ω (a|α, Z) = P
[
si (a;Z) > max
1≤j 6=i≤n
Bj
∣∣∣∣Ai = α, Z]
and si (·;Z) = Bi (·|Z). 
A.2 Proof of Theorems 3 and 4
In this proof, we assume i = 1 without loss of generality and remove the corresponding index
for the sake of brevity. In what follows |·| stands for the Euclidean norm of a vector or the
absolute value of a real number. C denotes a constant that may vary from line to line.
A.2.1 The two bidder case: proof of Theorem 3
We detail here the proof of Step 3 in Section 3.3.1. Recall it was shown in Section 3.3.1 that
Φ(·) is identified over R2+ from
U (α|Z) = Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z ′2γ2 (G2B1 (α|Z))]
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which is also identified, as γ1(1) and γ2(1). We now show that γ1(·) and γ2(·) are identified.
Differentiating U(α|Z) with respect to α gives
∂Φ
∂x1
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]]
d {Z ′1γ1 (α)}
dα
+
∂Φ
∂x2
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]]
∂ {Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
=
∂U (α|Z)
∂α
.
Differentiating with respect to the entry Z2d gives, by (3.8),
∂Φ
∂x2
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2]× γ2d [G2B1 (α|Z)]
+
∂Φ
∂x2
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]]
∂G2B1(α|Z)
∂Z2d
g2b1 (α|Z)
∂ {Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
=
∂U (α|Z)
∂Z2d
which implies, for the column Gradient vector ∂Z2U (α|Z) =
[
∂U(α|Z)
∂Z2d
]′
d=1,...,D
,
∂Φ
∂x2
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]Z2]× Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]
+
∂Φ
∂x2
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]]
Z ′2∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z)
g2b1 (α|Z)
∂ {Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
= Z ′2∂Z2U (α|Z)
Define now
Γ (α|Z) = [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]′]′
and for
∂Φ
∂xj
[Γ] (α|Z) = ∂Φ
∂xj
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]]
consider the 2× 2 matrices
D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) =
 ∂Φ∂x1 [Γ] (α|Z) 0
0 ∂Φ
∂x2
[Γ] (α|Z)
 ,
G2 (α|Z) =
 1 1
0
Z′
2
∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
g2b1(α|Z)
 =
 1 0
0 α(1−α)
g2b1(α|Z)
×
 1 1
0
Z′
2
∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
α(1−α)

so that Assumptions I and S-(iv) with Lemma 1-(ii) ensure that G2 (α|Z) has an inverse
when α belongs to (0, 1) with
G−12 (α|Z) =
 1 − g2b1(α|Z)Z′2∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
0 g2b1(α|Z)
Z′
2
∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
 =
 1 − α(1−α)Z′2∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
0 α(1−α)
Z′
2
∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
×
 1 0
0 g2b1(α|Z)
α(1−α)
 .
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Observe that D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) has an inverse for all (α, Z) by Assumption P, while Assumption
I gives that G2 (α|Z) diverges with the order 1/(1 − α) when α goes to 1. Define also the
vector
Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) =
 ∂Z2U (α|Z)
g2b1 (α|Z)
{
Z ′2∂Z2U (α|Z)− ∂Φ∂x2 [Γ] (α|Z)Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]
}
 .
Then the differential system above writesG2 (α|Z)D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) Γ(1) (α|Z) = Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z),
so that Γ (·|Z) must solve
Γ(1) (α|Z) = {G2 (α|Z)D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)}−1Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) (A.1)
over (0, 1). As the LHS is continuous over [0, 1], so must be the RHS. Hence the differential
system (A.1) holds over [0, 1] with a known terminal value Γ (1|Z) by Assumption S-(iii).
Suppose now that a continuously differentiable Γ˜ (α|Z) = [Z ′1γ˜1 (α) , Z ′2γ˜2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]′]′
also solves the differential system (A.1) with the terminal condition Γ˜ (1|Z) = Γ (1|Z). Then
(A.1) gives
Γ˜(1)(α|Z)− Γ(1)(α|Z) =
{
G2 (α|Z)D
[
Φ, Γ˜
]
(α|Z)
}−1
Ψ
[
Φ, Γ˜
]
(α|Z)
−{G2 (α|Z)D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)}−1Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) . (A.2)
Let |·| be the Euclidean norm and set, for a fixed Z, ∆(α) = Γ˜(α|Z) − Γ(α|Z). Note that
∆(·) is continuously differentiable with ∆(1) = 0, so that there exists a λ > 0 such that for
all α
|∆(α)| ≤ λ(1− α).
Since the partial derivatives of Φ(·) are Lipshitz by Assumption P, the expression ofG−12 (α|Z)
and Assumption I imply by (A.2), for all α in [0, 1],
∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ C
1− α |∆(α)| .
Hence for all ǫ > 0 small enough, (A.2) gives
∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) C
ǫ
|∆(α)|+ I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1) λ. (A.3)
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It follows from (A.3) that
∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λC
ǫ
(1− α) + I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1)λ
and then, since ∆(1) = 0,
|∆(α)| =
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
α
∆(1)(t)dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λCǫ (1− α)22 + I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1) λ(1− α)
≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λC
ǫ
(1− α)2
2
+ I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1)λǫ.
Substituting in (A.3) shows that
∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λ(C
ǫ
)2
(1− α)2
2
+ I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1) λ.
An additional iteration shows that
|∆(α)| ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λ
(
C
ǫ
)2
(1− α)3
3!
+ I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1) λǫ,
∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λ(C
ǫ
)3
(1− α)3
3!
+ I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1) λ.
Iterating then gives, for any integer number p ≥ 2, any ǫ > 0 small enough and all α of [0, 1],
|∆(α)| ≤ I (α ≤ 1− ǫ) λ ǫ
C
(
C
ǫ
)p
(1− α)p
p!
+ I (1− ǫ < α ≤ 1) λǫ
As limp↑∞
(
C
ǫ
)p (1−α)p
p!
= 0, it follows that for all α in [0, 1], |∆(α)| ≤ λǫ for all ǫ > 0, which
implies ∆(·) = 0 over [0, 1]. Then Assumption S and Lemma 1-(ii) imply that γ˜1(·) = γ1(·)
and γ˜2(·) = γ2(·). Hence the slope [γ1(·), γ2(·)] is identified. This ends the proof of the
Theorem. 
A.2.2 More than two bidders: proof of Theorem 4
For the sake of notation, assume n = 3, the case of a larger number of bidders being similar,
and set i = 1.
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Identification of Φ(·) and γj(0), j in I. Let
W (α|Z) = ∂V 1 (a|α, Z)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=α
be the function in (3.6), which is
W (α|Z) = g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]] c (t2|α, Z) dt2
+ g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)] c (t3|α, Z) dt3
setting c (ti|α, Z) = c (ti|A1 = α,Aj = GjB1 (α|Z) , Z) where (i, j) is (2, 3) or (3, 2). With
this notation
∂ω (a|α, Z)
∂a
∣∣∣∣
a=α
= g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
c (t2|α, Z) dt2
+ g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
c (t3|α, Z) dt3,
U1 (α|Z) = W (α|Z)
∂ω(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
.
This implies by the initial bid condition in Assumption S-(ii) and by S-(iv),
U1 (0|Z) = lim
α↓0
W (α|Z)
∂ω(a|α,Z)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=α
= Φ [Z ′1γ1 (0) , Z
′
2γ2 (0) , Z
′
3γ3 (0)] .
This identifies the set I of active signals and the corresponding γj (0) through the partial
derivatives ∂ZjU1(0|Z), Assumption G-(ii), Assumption P and using the normalization con-
dition ∂
∂xj
Φ(0, 0, 0) = 1. Assumptions Z and G-(ii) ensures it is possible to find Z1, Z2 and
Z3 such that (Z
′
1γ1 (0) , Z
′
2γ2 (0) , Z
′
3γ3 (0)) = (x1, x2, x3) for any (x1, x2, x3) in R
3
+∗. This
shows that U1 (0|Z) identifies Φ (·) over R3+ by continuity.
Identification of γj(·), j in I. Suppose all the signals are active, I = {1, 2, 3}, the other
cases being similar. As for the two bidder case, the proof proceeds by finding an integro-
differential system which unique solution is (γ1 (·) , γ2 (·) , γ3 (·)). Set
Γ (α|Z) = [γ1 (α) , γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]]′ .
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Differentiating W (α|Z) with respect to α gives
D1 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) d {Z
′
1γ1 (α)}
dα
+ g2b1 (α|Z)D2 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) ∂ {Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
+ g3b1 (α|Z)D3 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) ∂ {Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
= Ψ1 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)
where
D1 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) = g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
∂Φ
∂x1
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]] c (t2|α, Z) dt2
+ g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
∂Φ
∂x1
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)] c (t3|α, Z) dt3,
D2 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) =
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
∂Φ
∂x2
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)] c (t3|α, Z)dt3,
D3 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) =
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
∂Φ
∂x3
[Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]] c (t2|α, Z) ,
and where Ψ1 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) is equal to
∂W (α|Z)
∂α
− ∂g2b1 (α|Z)
∂α
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)] c (t3|α, Z) dt3
− ∂g3b1 (α|Z)
∂α
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]] c (t2|α, Z)dt2
− 2g2b1 (α|Z) g3b1 (α|Z) c [G2B1 (α|Z) , G3B1 (α|Z) |α, Z]
× Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]]
− g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)]
∂c (t3|α, Z)
∂α
dt3
− g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]]
∂c (t2|α, Z)
∂α
dt2.
Differentiating W (α|Z) with respect to Z2d gives, by (3.8)
D2 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) 1
g2b1 (α|Z)
∂G2B1 (α|Z)
∂Z2d
∂ {Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
+D3 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) 1
g3b1 (α|Z)
∂G3B1 (α|Z)
∂Z2d
∂ {Z ′3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
= ψ2d [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)
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where
ψ2d [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) = ∂W (α|Z)
∂Z2d
− g2b1 (α|Z) γ2d [G2B1 (α|Z)]
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
Φx2 [Z
′
1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)] c (t3|α, Z)dt3
− ∂g2b1 (α|Z)
∂Z2d
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)] c (t3|α, Z)dt3
− ∂g3b1 (α|Z)
∂Z2d
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]] c (t2|α, Z)dt2
−
(
g2b1 (α|Z) ∂G3B1 (α|Z)
∂Z2d
+ g3b1 (α|Z) ∂G2B1 (α|Z)
∂Z2d
)
× Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]] c [G2B1 (α|Z) , G3B1 (α|Z) |α]
− g2b1 (α|Z)
∫ G3B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)] , Z ′3γ3 (t3)]
∂c (t3|α, Z)
∂Z2d
dt3
− g3b1 (α|Z)
∫ G2B1(α|Z)
0
Φ [Z ′1γ1 (α) , Z
′
2γ2 (t2) , Z
′
3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]]
∂c (t2|α, Z)
∂Z2d
dt2.
Multiplying by Z2d and summing then gives, for Ψ2 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) =
∑D
d=1 Z2dψ2d [Φ,Γ] (α|Z),
D2 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) Z
′
2∂Z2G2B1 (α|Z)
g2b1 (α|Z)
∂ {Z ′2γ2 [G2B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
+
D3 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) Z
′
2∂Z2G3B1 (α|Z)
g3b1 (α|Z)
∂ {Z ′3γ3 [G3B1 (α|Z)]}
∂α
= Ψ2 [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)
A similar equation holds for Z3. Let D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) be the 3×3 diagonal matrix with entries
Dk [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) andΨ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) be the 3×1 vector with entries Ψk [Φ,Γ] (α|Z), k = 1, 2, 3.
Define
G (α|Z) =

1 g2b1 (α|Z) g3b1 (α|Z)
0
Z′
2
∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
g2b1(α|Z)
Z′
2
∂Z2G3B1(α|Z)
g3b1(α|Z)
0
Z′
3
∂Z3G2B1(α|Z)
g2b1(α|Z)
Z′
3
∂Z3G3B1(α|Z)
g3b1(α|Z)

=

1 g2b1 (α|Z) g3b1 (α|Z)
0
Z′
2
∂Z2G2B1(α|Z)
α(1−α)
Z′
2
∂Z2G3B1(α|Z)
α(1−α)
0
Z′
3
∂Z3G2B1(α|Z)
α(1−α)
Z′
3
∂Z3G3B1(α|Z)
α(1−α)
×

1 0 0
0 α(1−α)
g2b1(α|Z)
0
0 0 α(1−α)
g3b1(α|Z)
 .
As in the two bidder case, Assumptions I and S-(iv) with Lemma 1-(ii) ensure that G (α|Z)
has an inverse when α belongs to (0, 1) with G−1 (α|Z) of order 1/α when α goes to 0.
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Observe as well that D [Φ,Γ] (α|z) has an inverse for all α under Assumption I. G (α|Z)
also has an inverse for α in (0, 1) but not if α = 0 or α = 1. Stacking the equations above
together shows that
G (α|Z)D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z) d
dα
Γ (α|z) = Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)
for all α in [0, 1]. This also gives for all α in [0, 1]
d
dα
Γ (α|Z) = {G (α|Z)D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)}−1Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)
passing at the limit in the RHS for α = 0 or 1.
As above, identification of the slope functions holds provided two continuously differen-
tiable solutions of (A.2.2), Γ (·|Z) and Γ˜ (·|Z) with Γ˜ (0|Z) = Γ (0|Z), must be equal. Now
it holds
d
dα
Γ (α|Z)− d
dα
Γ˜ (α|Z) = {G (α|Z)D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)}−1Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)
−
{
G (α|Z)D
[
Φ, Γ˜
]
(α|Z)
}−1
Ψ
[
Φ, Γ˜
]
(α|Z)
with
∣∣∣D [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)−D [Φ, Γ˜] (α|Z)∣∣∣ ≤ Cα and ∣∣∣Ψ [Φ,Γ] (α|Z)−Ψ [Φ, Γ˜] (α|Z)∣∣∣ ≤ Cα
for all α. Set, for a fixed Z, ∆(α) = Γ˜(α|Z) − Γ(α|Z). Note that ∆(·) is continuously
differentiable with ∆(0) = 0, ∆(α) =
∫ α
0
∆(1)(t)dt and that there exists a λ > 0 such that
for all α
|∆(α)| ≤ λα.
It also holds for all α in [0, 1] ∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ C
α
|∆(α)| .
Hence for all ǫ > 0 small enough, (A.2) gives
∣∣∆(1)(α)∣∣ ≤ I (α ≤ ǫ) λ+ I (ǫ < α ≤ 1) C
ǫ
|∆(α)| .
Arguing as in the two bidder case gives that ∆(·) = 0, which establishes identification of the
γj(·), j ∈ I. This ends the proof of the Theorem. 
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